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ABSTRACT 
 
The 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) changed the dynamics of its 
engagement with the former Soviet Republics which now constitute the Eastern 
neighbourhood. As well as manifold implications of the eastward shift of the EU  
border and ‘acquisition of a shared neighbourhood with Russia, the enlarged EU 
now  incorporated  new  member  states  with  foreign  policy  concerns  focused 
mostly on the Eastern neighbours. Four of the new member states – the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – brought into the EU with them their 
own subregional alliance in the form of the Visegrad Group (VG). Since 2004 the 
‘Visegrad  4’  (V4)  have  been  attempting  to  develop  an  effective  multilateral 
contribution to EU ‘Eastern Policy’ and to reform processes in the WNIS. This 
paper  argues  that  while  there  has  been  some  evidence  of  an  effective  VG 
multilateral approach, in both inputs to EU Eastern policy and modest support 
for broader ‘Europeanisation’ processes in WNIS,  so far the VG has failed to 
achieve  a  lead  role  in  EU  Eastern  policy  and  that  a  range  of  obstacles  have 
limited the multilateral approach of the V4 in general. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“The Visegrad Group is ready to assist countries aspiring for EU membership by sharing 
and transmitting their knowledge and experience. The Visegrad Group countries are also 
ready to use their unique regional and historical experience and to contribute to shaping 
and implementing the European Union’s policies towards the countries of Eastern and 
Southern Europe.”
1 
 
 
The  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  (ENP),  launched  by  the  EU  in  May  2004  as  the 
framework for relations with new neighbours, looked inadequate before it had even got off 
the ground.  ENP fell well short of what the Ukrainian ‘Orange’ politicians expected, was 
rejected  by  Russia  and  also  faced  a  well  of  criticism  from  inside  the  EU.  Against  a  
background of multiple pressures for reform and development, it is hardly surprising that 
ENP has been in a rather fluid state so far. Following various member state interventions, 
such as the Germany’s ‘ENP Plus’ proposal, and the subsequent European Commission’s 
2006 review of ENP, the latest proposal is for an ‘Eastern Partnership’ (EP) that will amongst 
other things, formally separate of the Southern and Eastern flanks of ENP.  An important part 
of the story of the evolutionary character of ENP is the fact that the 2004 enlargement itself 
introduced  an  additional  dynamic  into  the  EU’s  Eastern  policy.  ENP  was,  of  course, 
formulated by the pre-2004 EU, but a set of new member states with keen stakes in the EU’s 
Eastern policy were now in position to be become players in its future development.  
Despite the key fact that it was their accession that which forced the issue up the pecking 
order, the role and influence of Central and East European (CEE) states on EU relations with 
Eastern neighbours has received little attention in scholarly debates. Since May 2009 will 
mark the fifth anniversary of both the Eastward enlargement and launch of ENP, it is timely 
to reflect on the CEE influence so far.  As a contribution to this research agenda, this paper 
article analyses the role of multilateral Visegrad Group (VG) cooperation on EU Eastern 
policy,  a  topic  which  has  received  virtually  no  coverage.  Throughout  its  relatively  short 
history the VG subregional alliance has been used as a multilateral foreign policy tool of the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Prior to 2004 it was used mainly to support 
the EU and NATO accession endeavour. Since then, the Eastern neighbours have been a 
prime focus of the VG agenda for foreign policy cooperation. As with previous ones, the 
latest (2008/9) VG Presidency, held by Poland, stresses a number of goals for support of non-
EU European states. They include greater engagement of the V4 “in the establishment of the 
                                                 
1 “Declaration of Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary , the Republic of 
Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic on cooperation of  Visegrád Group countries 
after their accession to the European Union, Prague, 12 May 2004”.   3 
eastern  dimension  of  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy…in  the  negotiations  on  an 
enhanced  cooperation  agreement  between  the  EU  and  Ukraine…Promotion  of  European 
values and human rights (Belarus, GUAM Countries)…Promotion of reform process in the 
candidate  and  potential  candidate  countries  of  the  West  Balkans”  (Polish  VG  Program, 
2007/8, p.2).
2  
The paper looks at two main questions. First, at which levels and in what dimensions has the 
VG multilateral approach towards the EU’s Eastern neighbours been evident?  Second, if 
reality is not matching rhetoric and the VG could be deemed to be operating below potential 
in this domain, then what factors have so far hindered it? The paper is organised as follows. 
First there is a brief review of the VG’s origins and evolution. Second, a discussion of why 
EU Eastern policy became a prime focus of the VG foreign policy cooperation agenda after 
2004. Third, what so far has been the content of VG multilateral contributions to EU Eastern 
policy and to the Europeanisation of WNIS more broadly?
3 The final section discusses some 
problems of the multilateral approach which have been limiting the role of the VG to date. 
Some include factors beyond the control of the V4 while others reflect some weaknesses of 
the  VG  multilateral  concept.  Finally,  before  moving  to  the  main  discussion,  it  is  worth 
emphasising that the case of the VG also provides insights into two other fields of interest. 
First, into evolving governance mechanisms in the EU of 27 in which decision-making “now 
depends  greatly  on  national  influence  and  strategic  alliance  building  among  members” 
(Kempe, 2008, 7). Second, into how effectively the VG is consolidating its post-enlargement 
role as a subregional alliance within the EU aiming for not only effective internal cooperation 
but also a foreign policy cooperation role to replace its original mission as a device to support 
V4 EU and NATO entry. 
 
  
2. THE VISEGRAD GROUP: ORIGINS, AIM  AND EVOLUTION 
The VG is best described as framework for both internally and externally oriented subregional 
cooperation between its four Central European member states. In existence since 1990, and 
with the cooperation well embedded into the Visegrad 4 (V4) government structures, and, one 
even  might  say,  norms,  the  VG  can  be  considered  a  permanent  feature  of  the  European 
political  landscape.  The  inaugural  VG  meeting  took  place  in  Bratislava  in  April  1990. 
Instigated  by  Vaclav  Havel,  the  Presidents  of  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary  and  Poland  held 
informal discussions around the themes of “the ‘coordination of policies’ and synchronisation 
                                                 
2 The VG Presidency rotates on an annual basis. Hungary will take over in 2009, followed by Slovakia 
in 2010. 
3  Europeanisation  is  defined  in  this  case  as  the  support  and  promotion  of  reforms  leading  to  the 
establishment of EU standards and the process of developing new and enhancing existing dimensions 
of ‘cross-border connectivity’ between the WNIS and other European states.   4 
of steps’ on the road to Europe” (Cottey, 1999, 70). After a few months lull, VG Presidents, 
Foreign Ministers and Parliamentarians met in Budapest on 15 February 1991 for the signing 
of  the  original  Visegrad  Declaration.  While  VG  cooperation  was  in  many  respects  an 
autonomous process launched by the first post-communist leaderships of Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary  and  Poland,  it  did  have  external  drivers.  The  realities  and  uncertainties  of  the 
external economic and political dimensions of the impending transformation meant that the 
then Visegrad 3 (V3) simply had “no alternative to cooperation” (Vaduchova, 1993).   
The core mission of VG cooperation concerned the two key foreign policy objectives of the 
time – dissolution of the Soviet-era security and integration structures and accession to the 
EU and NATO. The V3 effectively pursued common policies around these goals and by 1992 
the  VG  brand  was  well  established  within  and  outside  the  region.  Yet  1992  also  saw 
developments  that  brought  about  the  onset  of  decline  of  the  VG.  The  division  of 
Czechoslovakia, the advent of CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement), a tendency 
for competition to replace cooperation in EU relations and Slovakia’s progressive loss of 
ground in the EU and NATO enlargement process all undermined the VG. The period 1993-
98 is usually characterised as, at best, a time of dormant VG cooperation. A major relaunch 
occurred in 1998 following governmental changes in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Also at 
this time, the EU pre-accession process had now reached the membership negotiation stage 
and was generating issues of common interest that fuelled political cooperation for pragmatic 
reasons - for example, the need to maximise Slovakia’s chances of joining the EU at the same 
time as the other Visegrad states. Significant steps forward in formalising the VG cooperation 
framework were taken in May 1999 following a review of the main principles and procedures 
of the subregional alliance. Henceforth there would be two regular meetings per year of Prime 
Ministers  plus  regular  meetings  at  various  other  governmental  levels,  and  a  rotating 
Presidency of the VG to coordinate cooperation and compile the annual VG ‘work plan’. The 
International Visegrad Fund (IVF), which is the sole VG permanent institution, was founded 
in 2000 as an instrument to develop civic dimensions of cooperation and strengthen public 
awareness. The IVF has funded an array of projects to support those aims.
4  
Following completion of EU accession negotiations, there was a debate on the future role and 
even viability of the VG in which officials, experts and even the media participated. After 
some 13 years of cooperation, the “fulfilment of the intentions set out in the (February 1991) 
Visegrad Declaration put the participating countries before the question of how to go on” 
(Czech VG Presidency Report 2004). Despite the negativity generated by high-profile VG 
disputes  and  tensions  during  2002  and  2003  the  outcome  of  the  reflection  process  was 
                                                 
4 Each VG member contributes an equal (25%) share of the IVF budget. The current annual budget is   
5 million Euro.   5 
positive.
5 A new framework document for cooperation was duly completed during the 2003/4 
Czech Presidency of the VG and signed in May 2004. It confirmed that “(t)he cooperation of 
the Visegrad  Group  countries  will continue  to focus  on  regional  activities  and  initiatives 
aimed  at strengthening  the  identity  of the  Central European  region.  In  this context, their 
cooperation  will  be  based  on  concrete  projects  and  will  maintain  its  flexible  and  open 
character”  (2004  VG  Declaration,  1).  Four  dimensions  of  cooperation  were  specified: 
cooperation within the VG area itself; cooperation within the EU; cooperation with other 
partners (including individual countries and other subregional structures); cooperation within 
NATO and other international organisations. Along with the general purposes of the post-
enlargement VG, the ‘new’ 2004 guidelines specifically highlighted cooperation towards the 
new EU Eastern neighbours as a key mission. Accordingly, the (first post-enlargement) VG  
work  plan  of  the  Polish  2004/5  VG  Presidency  contained  five  main  priorities  including  
“participation  in  the  formation  and  implementation  of  the  Union’s  New  neighbourhood 
policy” (Polish VG Program 2004/5). Results came early, according to the Report of that 
Polish Presidency which recorded that VG countries’ support for democratic transition in 
Ukraine was “the first manifestation of undertakings by the new member states addressed to a 
direct neighbour of the EU” (Polish VG Presidency Report 2005).
6  
  
2. THE V4 FOREIGN POLICY COOPERATION AGENDA BEYOND  EU ACCESSION 
Despite measures to stimulate intra-VG cooperation after 1999, the overriding image of the 
VG in the 1991-2004 period was of an entity focused on serving the Euro-Atlantic integration 
ambitions of the V4. Completion of these objectives created room for multilateral approaches 
where shared foreign policy interests were either already in place or would come to the fore in 
the context of the expanded EU and NATO. The commitment to retain external cooperation 
as  an  important  sphere  of  the  V4  subregional  alliance’s  role  would  have  been  rather 
unsustainable without genuine and substantial shared interests. It was rather obvious where 
any VG external cooperation in the post-accession period could be oriented. As Missiroli put 
it: “all (new CEE members) have a strong interest in the formulation of those external policies 
of the enlarged union that might affect their immediate vicinity. After all, most of them will 
become  the  new  external frontier  of  the  EU. The  permeability  and safety  of the  Eastern 
borders and all common ‘direct neighbourhood’ policies will become vital interests and shape 
their behaviour on CFSP and other issues. The condition of national minorities, cross-border 
trade and visa regulations, energy and environmental issues, Balkan stability, relations with 
                                                 
5 See Dangerfield (2008a) 
6 Whilst the Polish intervention, together with Lithuania, in the tense period after the 2004 Ukrainian 
Presidential election played  a crucial role this was not of course a Visegrad exercise. At pure VG level 
the main events at the political level during the 2004/5 period were a meeting of V4 foreign ministers 
with the Ukrainian foreign minister in Vilnius on 21/4/05 (Polish VG Presidency Report 2005, 1).      6 
Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and, of course, Russia will be priority issues” (Missiroli, 2005, 
129).  
Foreign policy scholars/analysts within the V4 countries  recognised that the VG could play a 
useful role in the CEE members foreign policy and various contributions that recommended 
this  direction  for  the  VG no  doubt  helped  push  it  forward.    Gromadzki  et  al  wrote:  “In 
addition to assistance provided by the EU, Visegrad countries should consider using their own 
resources to maintain and expand cooperation and encourage people-to-people contacts in 
their  respective  countries  and  Ukraine.  This  could  take  place  bilaterally  or  through  joint 
efforts, for instance through the International Visegrad Fund” (Gromadzki et al, 2004, 16). 
From a Hungarian perspective, the need to take the VG more seriously and enthusiastically 
than in the past was stressed because, inter alia, of the need for Hungary to prove “that it has 
the ability to implement a neighbourhood policy in a partnership. If it were to fail in this 
endeavour,  it  would  not  be  more  than  a  mere  observer  of  the  Eastern  and  Balkan 
neighbourhood policy” (Hamberger, 2006, 104). In addition, while mindful of obstacles to 
success, a view from Prague stated that “the Eastern policy seems a hopeful candidate for 
replacing  enlargement-related  matters  as  the  main  vehicle  of  these  (the  V4  –  author’s 
insertion) countries foreign policy cooperation” (Kratochvil and Temets, 2007, 10). Though 
not specifically discussing the question of a VG role, criticism of ENP from within the new 
member states pointed to the need for a significant Central European intervention. The EU’s 
Eastern policy had been badly blighted because it was a product of the EU15 but had to serve 
the enlarged EU and the interests and perspectives of the new members too. Duleba, from a 
Slovak perspective, wrote that “the enlargement of 2004 changed the EU as an international 
actor per se. The EU-25/27 simply cannot have the same foreign policy as the EU15 had. The 
EU’s relations with its direct neighbours cannot be of the same nature as its relations with its 
indirect ones” Duleba (2007, 1). EU Eastern policy and its flagship framework, the ENP, 
needed the input of the new member states not only because of their greater expertise when it 
came  to  the  WNIS  but  also  because  those  new  members  actually  bordering  the  Eastern 
neighbours would feel the main effects of an inadequate EU policy. Additionally, apart from 
the standard argument that ENP was deficient because non-European countries are included 
in the same policy as neighbours in Europe, Duleba stressed that Eastern Europe needs a 
single  and  consistent  value-based  EU  policy  rather  than  the  fragmented  approach  which 
differentiates three-ways between Russia, Ukraine/Moldova and Belarus.   
A key consequence of the Eastward enlargement was that the EU “arguably emerged as a 
stronger and more self-conscious reform-promotion actor with relevant implications for its 
external policies” (Solonenko, 2008, 25). The development of the VG as a foreign policy 
actor that would work by supporting a certain direction of reform in EU Eastern neighbours 
certainly reflected EU-isation of foreign policy making in the V4. Yet certain key instincts of   7 
current  VG  foreign  policy  cooperation  became  embedded  after  the  VG  revived  in  1998. 
Experience-sharing,  for  example,  became  regular  practice,  including  “exchange  of 
information related to the process of negotiations with the EU and the state of the preparation 
of V4 member countries for membership. To this end, consultations of negotiators with the 
EU  have  been  agreed  and  are  regularly  held”  (Czech  VG  Presidency  Report  2000,  1). 
Furthermore, a key theme of post-1998 VG cooperation was assistance to the process of 
Slovak  ‘catch-up’  of  Slovakia  in  Euro-Atlantic  integration,  particularly  for  NATO 
membership (including both practical preparation tasks and V3 political backing/lobbying on 
behalf of Slovakia). This helped lock assistance to slow-lane post-communist countries into 
the portfolio of VG tasks. In sum, the current mode of VG engagement with the WNIS (and 
aspiring  EU/NATO  entrants  generally)  came  out  of  a  clear    synergy  of  the  V4’s  own  
experience of transition and EU pre-accession, a decade-long tradition of using the VG for 
experience-sharing and know-how transfer and the EU-isation of  the V4’s character as a 
foreign policy actor.       
Finally, although the post-enlargement context gave strong momentum to the VG’s ambition 
to play a lead role in EU Eastern policy, the VG had already made significant moves in that 
direction.  Continuity  rather  than  change  was  more  the  order  of  the  day.  Scrutiny  of  the 
content of various VG Declarations and published work-plans during the 1999-2004 period 
reveals that support for and assistance to the WNIS was already clearly on the VG radar.
7 For 
example  during  its  2002/3  VG  Presidency  Slovakia  “organised  a  meeting  of  the  State 
Secretaries of the V4 countries and Ukraine on 8-9 July 2002 in Košice. The main subject of 
the  discussion  was  the  cooperation  between  the  V4  and  Ukraine  in  a  wider  context  of 
European integration. The State Secretaries exchanged their views on co-operation in the 
format of V4 and Ukraine, on the Schengen border issues, including visa regime and cross-
border co-operation” (Slovak VG Presidency Report 2003’).  
Clearly, then, the VG focus on WNIS was well-established prior to EU entry and was evident 
not only in VG declarations, but also in the form of political dialogue and  some modest but 
useful concrete assistance.  In the immediate post-enlargement period several things came 
together to stimulate upgrading and further operationalisation of the VG focus on WNIS. 
First, and especially important, was the Orange Revolution. This gave the clearest green light 
so far for a ‘European choice’ for Ukraine and created a much firmer political footing for 
active engagement with the country. Second, the introduction of ENP brought into play a 
large scale EU policy to target both in its strategic and operational dimensions. ENP was 
already ripe for reform and open to influence as to how it could develop in the future. Thirdly, 
                                                 
7 Also verifying that this is a ‘real’ agenda for the VG based on solid foreign policy priorities, rather 
than an outcome of a post-enlargement search for a role.    
   8 
no longer pre-occupied with EU accession, VG states could participate in and attempt to steer 
the EU’s Eastern policy/ENP as equal partners and also above-average stakeholders in this 
dimension of EU affairs. The next section examines the substance of the VG multilateral 
approach.  
 
3. VISEGRAD GROUP COOPERATION TOWARDS EU EASTERN NEIGHBOURS  
 
An obvious route for the VG to attempt to wield influence is for them to act collectively, 
where possible, at the political level.
8  The V4 have issued numerous ‘Joint Declarations’ 
affirming their support for WNIS’ attempts to further advance their relations with the EU.
9 
These  have  been  both  statements  of  general  support  and  affirmation  of  V4  positions  on 
specific aspects of EU engagement with the WNIS. For example on the need to increase the 
size of EU financial commitments overall, to address the imbalance between the resources 
allocated to the Eastern and Southern dimensions of ENP respectively and so on.  
When it came to following up declarations with serious attempts at collective VG inputs to 
EU Eastern policy/ENP, there was little evidence of this until after 2006. That is, until after 
the  release  of  Germany’s  ‘ENP-Plus’  proposal  in  July  2006  and  shortly  afterwards  in 
September, reactions from Lithuania and Poland. The Polish and Lithuanian governments 
“issued  non-papers  demanding  strategies  beyond  the  current  ENP.  Both  governments 
differentiate      between  ‘European  neighbours’  requiring  an  institutional  perspective  and 
‘neighbours  of  Europe’  which  do  not”.(Kempe,  2008,  10).  These  interventions  and  the 
ensuing  European  Commission  Communication  on  Strengthening  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy of December 2006 marked the onset of more visible and intensive 
collective  VG  focus  on  EU  Eastern  policy.  On  22  January  2007  the  V4  stressed  their 
determination “to contribute to the strengthening of the European Neighbourhood Policy… 
(and) intend to prepare detailed proposals for reinforcement of the ENP in coming weeks” 
(VG Joint Statement ENP, 2007). Collective action was actually already in evidence at this 
time. During the negotiations on the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI) Regulation a “Non-paper of the V4 countries promoting the Eastern Dimension of the 
ENP was presented in January 2007, with the Czech Republic and Poland most active, while 
                                                 
8 It should be remembered that there is no expectation that VG is somehow a platform in which the 
individual VG members’ positions on specific issues of any kind will automatically be harmonised. 
There is a clear, accepted understanding that sensitive, contentious topics in intra-VG politics, such as 
national minorities, for example, are never brought to the Visegrad table. The VG agenda automatically 
gravitates  to  areas  where  the  need  and  will  to  cooperate/coordinate  is  strong  and  conducive  to 
collective  undertakings.  A  key  advantage  of  the  VG  (and  something  which  is  arguably  not  found 
elsewhere  in  the  EU)  is  that  it  does provide  a  set  of  formal  mechanisms  through  which  common 
positions and interests – where they exist - can come to the fore, be agreed and then collectively 
pursued.  
9 This can be ascertained by the many statements to this effect contained in the various official VG 
documents, including Declarations, Programmes of the individual VG presidencies and so on.    9 
at  the  same  time  some  of  the  ‘old’  member  states  preferred  to  focus  on  the  South” 
(Řiháčková,  31).  The V4  proceeded to  compile  a more  substantial  document  which  they 
presented at GAERC (General Affairs and External Relations Council) in April 2007. The 
Visegrad  Group  Contribution  to  the  Discussion  on  the  Strengthening  of the  European 
Neighbourhood  Policy  ran  to  six  pages  and  covered  a  range  of  issues.  It  made  a  clear 
distinction  between    Mediterranean  and  Eastern  dimensions  of  ENP  and  stressed  key 
differences between them in historical relations to the EU and expectations of it. This ‘non-
paper’ called for  strengthening of the Eastern dimension in three ways. First it argued for 
“dedication  of  more  attention  and  resources”.  Second,  whilst  not  openly  calling  for  an 
accession  perspective  for  Eastern  neighbours  there  and  then,  the  motivational  power  of 
indulging EU entry ambitions was stressed and “(m)embership aspirations of any European 
country should be regarded as legitimate” (Visegrad Group Contribution 2007, 2). Third, 
regional cooperation between the EU and the Eastern neighbours was endorsed, with large-
scale sectoral cooperation (echoing the German ENP-Plus proposal) a key goal of the regional 
approach. Increased funds were also recommended for the ‘Governance Facility’ included in 
the ENPI:  “the V4 countries would prefer to increase this facility. We do not believe that the 
envisioned amount is sufficient to encourage difficult reforms and reward good performers” 
(Visegrad Group Contribution 2007, 4).  
The current scenario of ENP now de facto compartmentalised into the Mediterranean Union 
and  Eastern  Partnership  (EP)  respectively  clearly  fits  with  what  the  V4  have  been 
endeavouring  to  achieve.  Their role  in  helping  to  bring  the  EP  to fruition    seems  rather 
indisputable, albeit a qualified one in that the VG itself played an endorsing/supporting rather 
than a leading role. Solonenko observed that the EP was “to a large extent shaped to respond 
to Ukraine’s ambitions and aims to demonstrate the potential of the new EU member states, 
namely Poland and the Czech Republic, in setting (the) foreign policy agenda for the EU.” As 
noted above the April 2007 non-paper openly advocated a distinct framework for Eastern 
neighbours, though this was  only part, albeit a vital part of course, of the V4 preferred 
approach to the reformulation of the ENP. They also stressed the need to incorporate the 
countries covered by the Eastern dimension into more of a ‘group’ approach and supported 
“initiatives  aimed  at  creating  a  multilateral  component  of  the  EU’s  cooperation  with  the 
Eastern neighbours” (Joint Statement VG Foreign Ministers April 2008). Two months later, 
the  favourable  reception  the  EP  concept  received  in  the  EU  (and  approval  in  the  June 
European  Council)  representing  a  major  breakthrough  in  terms  of  VG  objectives  on  EU 
policy towards the WNIS. The VG endorsed the EP proposal at the Prime Ministers’ Annual 
Summit in Prague on 16 June 2008. It was of course notable that the EP proposal was tabled 
in the EU as a Polish-Swedish and not a joint VG initiative. The significance of this will be 
remarked upon later.    10 
VG political cooperation has also provided an additional arena for dialogue between the V4 
and  specific  Eastern  neighbours.  Meetings  between  top  VG  officials  and  their  WNIS 
counterparts have occurred as separate events or as special sessions during VG summits or 
regular ministerial meetings. To give an example, on 10 June 2008, after meeting with the V4 
Prime Ministers during a visit to Poland, Ukrainian Prime Minister Tymoshenko told a TV 
correspondent  that  she  was  “convinced that the  union  of strong  prime  ministers  of these 
powerful countries will guide Ukraine. We want them to share experience, advise us and 
provide political assistance…I would like us as a country to join the European Union and we 
(the Visegrad four) will turn into a five” (One Plus One TV Report, 2008). These kinds of 
occasion, variously involving Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and Sectoral Ministers are 
valuable in several ways. For the neighbours, they can help ameliorate feelings of exclusion 
by offering privileged access to dialogue with the V4 states. The new EU member states are at 
the same time a particularly sympathetic and receptive audience. In addition, the Eastern 
neighbours  also  get  an  additional  platform  on  which  to  promote  their  European/EU 
credentials.  These  meetings  also  offer  opportunities  to  identify  and  discuss  common 
problems, develop cooperation agendas and identify ways in which the VG can assist the 
Eastern neighbours in their EU integration. Finally, together with IVF projects and bilateral 
contacts, they contribute to the important ‘socialisation’ processes identified by Solonenko 
(2008).   
Next, a particularly important contribution involving the so-called ‘V4+’ facility.
 10  The VG 
has been a forum for policy consultation and alliance-building with other member states and 
subregional groupings with specific interests in Eastern Europe, particularly over the last 
couple  of  years  as  ENP  reform  gathered  momentum.  These  occasions  have  included  the 
Nordic Council, the Baltic Three, Sweden and, most recently, Romania and Bulgaria. For 
example at a meeting in Warsaw on 26 September, the Ministers and Secretaries of State for 
European Affairs of the V4, Romania and Bulgaria reiterated their support for the EP. They 
called on the EU to “accelerate works on the EP to start its swift implementation and foster 
cooperation with the Eastern Partners” (Declaration of European Affairs Ministers September 
2008).  Most  recently,  a  meeting  convened  via  the  VG  mechanism  in  Warsaw  on  24 
November 2008 brought together Foreign Ministers of the V4, Baltic 3, Sweden, Romania 
and Bulgaria. It resulted in a Joint Statement showing that these ten countries would together 
push  strongly  for  Council  endorsement  of  the  ensuing  (3  December  2008)  Commission 
Proposal  on  ENP.  They  “expect  the  Eastern  Partnership  to  be  assigned  ambitious  goals, 
including enhancing the EU support in adaptation of Eastern partners to EU legislation, norms 
and standards, creating a deepened free trade area, launching the process aimed at a visa-free 
                                                 
10 ‘V4+’ refers to the principle of flexible cooperation between the V4 and any other country/group of 
countries  or international bodies on matters of common concern..    11 
regime with these countries as a long term goal, implementing important multilateral and 
regional projects” (Joint Statement Foreign Ministers of VG, Baltic 3, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Sweden November 2008).  
Finally, on political cooperation, EU Presidencies in principle provide a major opportunity for 
the V4 to promote shared positions in EU affairs. The 2009 Czech Presidency provided clear 
evidence that was the case as far as EU Eastern policy was concerned. In April 2008 “V4 
ministers  stated  that  the  Czech  Presidency  in  the  Council  of  the  EU  will  be  a  good 
opportunity to further enhance the Visegrad cooperation and to intensify the dialogue between 
the V4 member state presiding the EU and the Visegrad Group on common priorities” (Joint 
Statement VG Foreign Ministers April 2008).
11   The draft work programme for the Czech EU 
Presidency  stated  that  the  Czech  government  would  “during  its  EU  Council  presidency 
support  deepening  of  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  with  orientation  to  its  Eastern 
dimension” (Czech EU Presidency Programme). Despite the considerable turbulence during 
its EU Presidency, the Czech government managed to retain its focus on Eastern policy and 
was set to achieve a key V4 objective with the scheduled (May 2009) launch of the EP. The 
Czech  presidency  is  one  of  three  upcoming  VG  country  EU  Presidencies.  Hungary  and 
Poland have back-to-back Council Presidencies through 2011 which gives some scope to plan 
ahead.  Moreover,  a  Swedish  EU  Presidency  comes immediately  after  the  Czech  one  and 
Sweden is what might be called an ‘honorary’ VG member when it comes to the EU Eastern 
policy.   
Clearly, the need to address occurring crises does not totally derail the planned business of the 
EU. As one commentator put it the “EU presidency is a licence to pursue pet projects rather 
than an opportunity to change the course of the supertanker”.
12 The EP is both ‘pet project’ 
and currently built it to the course of the ‘supertanker’ as particularly strong imperatives have 
been driving it in any case. For example, one clear effect of the Russia-Georgia crisis has 
been for the EU to receive (in time-honoured fashion) a ‘wake-up call’ on its dealings with 
the Eastern neighbours – witness the recent keenness for a measure of rapprochement with 
Belarus. The combination of the EP project being approved in June 2008 and the Russia-
Georgia  conflict  shortly  afterwards  seems  to  have  not  only  accelerated  the  urgency  of 
upgrading EU relations with the Eastern neighbours but also the depth of integration which 
will be on offer. The November 2008 draft Commission communiqué on the EP started from 
the position that the “conflict in Georgia in August 2008 and its broader repercussions have 
                                                 
11 In an attempts to explore ways in which this might be possible within the Czech EU presidency, the 
Czech  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  hosted  a  major  VG  conference  –  “Visegrad  and  the  Czech 
Presidency of the EU” on 5-6 June 2008 (the Czech Republic at that time in the dual position of 
currently holding VG Presidency and the EU Presidency from January 2009) sponsored by the IVF and 
organised within the framework of the IVF ‘Strategic Programme’.  
12 Financial Times, 26 March 2009, p.10   12 
resulted in increased awareness of the vulnerability of eastern partners…There is a sense of 
urgency among member states as to the need to enhance relations with our eastern neighbours 
to support them in drawing closer to the EU” (Runner, 2008). The EP proposals include 
signing  of  Association  Agreements,  and  full  absorption  into  the  EU  internal  market  (as 
opposed to the partial and somewhat confused incorporation contained in the current ENP 
objectives)  to  give  them  effective  European  Economic  Area  status.  The  Commission 
proposals  also  suggest  rapid  moves  to  ease  the  current  obstacles  on  Eastern  neighbours 
citizens’  travel  into  the  Schengen  area,  including  waving  of  visa  fees.    So  this  was  an 
especially permissive time for new dynamics and developments in Eastern policy which in 
any case already had its place on the EU business agenda.  
Turning now to other forms of multilateral VG contributions, these are mainly carried out 
through the IVF which, since the 2004 EU enlargement, has been increasingly used as an 
instrument to support external actions of the VG. It does this in a number of ways as far as 
Eastern neighbours (and West Balkans) are concerned. First, entities from Eastern Europe 
(including Russia as well as the WNIS) have participated in a few IVF projects. For example 
in  2007  Russia  and  Ukraine  led  some  Small  Grant  (max  €4000)  and  Standard  Grant 
(usually between €4000 and €20000) projects. However, these projects are few in number and 
less than what the Central European Initiative (CEI) organises, for example. Second, and far 
more  significant,  is  the  Visegrad  Scholarship  Programme,  which  started  in  2003  as  a 
scheme to finance intra-VG postgraduate student mobility and was subsequently (in 2004) 
extended to enable students from certain non-VG countries – including WNIS, West Balkans 
and Russia - to study at a nominated VG university. VG Scholarships are offered to Masters’ 
and Doctoral students for between 1 and 4 semesters and offer € 2000 per semester (Intra-
Visegrad Scholarship) and €2500 per semester (Incoming Visegrad Scholarship). This is 
undoubtedly  a  valuable  activity,  especially  for  countries  hampered  by  a  lack  of  EU 
programmes to support outgoing students. Since it operates at postgraduate level, the scheme 
plays an important role in Europeanisation by  widening the horizons of the next generation of 
leaders/intelligentsia  (especially  important  for  say,  Belarus).    During  the  first  year  of 
operation,  Incoming  Scholarship  numbers  were  negligible,  but  have  steadily  increased, 
particularly  in  2007.  Since  2007  a  separate  programme  for  Ukrainians  has  operated, 
indicating the broader VG priority given to Ukraine, which has been the biggest recipient of 
the programme by some margin.  WNIS/Russia are the main recipients in overall terms with 
the West Balkans, apart from Serbia, not really taking part so far (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: Incoming Visegrad Scholarships, 2004-2007 (Number of scholarships allocated, 
by country) 
 
Home Country  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Albania 
 
0  0  0  0 
Belarus 
 
3  0  4  12 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
0  0  0  0 
Croatia 
 
0  0  0  1 
Macedonia 
 
0  0  0  0 
Moldova 
 
0  0  1  2 
Montenegro 
 
0  0  0  0 
Russian 
Federation 
 
1  1  3  13 
Serbia 
 
2  1  1  5 
Ukraine 
 
0  33  27  73 
Total 
 
6  35  36  106 
Source:  Annual Report of the International Visegrad Fund, various years 
 
The IVF also recently introduced Visegrad Strategic Programs, which provide relatively 
large  sums  for  projects  that  “link  institutions  of  all  four  Visegrad  Group  countries.  The 
projects must adhere to at least one of the priorities defined by the Conference of Ministers 
for the given year. The priorities follow the foreign policy priorities of the Visegrad Group” 
(IVF Annual Report 2007, 27). Four projects which have relevance for the VG states’ inputs 
to EU Eastern policy are currently being implemented (see Table 2). Like all IVF projects, 
they are run by NGOs and must involve all four VG countries. Though networks between VG 
researchers in this field are already well-established, IVF projects provide the key ingredient 
of financial means to support and motivate their collaborative work. Those projects focusing 
on  the  Eastern  neighbourhood  are  bringing  together  think-tanks  –  including  the  leading 
foreign and security policy analysts - to work together on Visegrad-level studies and policy 
research.  Their  effectiveness  will  be  revealed  in  due  course  (3  out  of  the  4  are  in  their 
early/mid stages). Outputs which have appeared so far include conferences and workshops to 
develop  and  share  ideas  and  experience,  policy  briefs,  in-depth  studies  of  specific 
issues/problems  (e.g.  visa  policy,  cross-border  people  movements,  energy  security). 
Communication  and  consultation  with  state  bodies  is  built  in  to  the  programmes  as  is  a   14 
process of obtaining inputs and advice from partners in the recipient countries via offering 
them  funded  access  to  conferences  and  workshops.  Recommendations  which  have  been 
reflected in the VG policy level have also been generated. For example, a Policy Brief by 
Balázs et al produced within the project Strengthening Central European Contribution to the 
Eastern Dimension of EU’s CFSP’ recommended that for Eastern policy “the EU needs to 
develop  a  coherent  two-tier  strategy:  The  existing  bilateral  frameworks  should  be 
complemented by a new regional framework(s). The Action Plans should facilitate political 
modernisation  and  democracy  building,  while  sectoral  agreements  (as  designed  in  the 
Commission’s Communication) should serve sectoral modernisation of new neighbours (Free 
Trade Agreements/FTA, Trans-European Networks/TEN)” (Balázs et al, 3). Another notable 
component of that same project is an ongoing collation of data on all VG entities, including 
NGOs not covered by IVF funds, currently providing know-how training/experience sharing 
to WNIS with the aim of  achieving a more effective and cost-efficient coordination of such 
activities. The policy-making contribution of the VG therefore includes sponsorship of major 
IVF projects aiming to improve the scope and effectiveness of V4 foreign policy cooperation. 
Finally, it should be noted that strategic projects oriented specifically towards cooperation 
towards Eastern neighbours should appear in the near future since the 2009 priorities include 
“Sharing V4 Know-How with Neighbouring Regions” (IVF Annual Report 2008, 12). 
 
 
Table 2: Visegrad ‘Strategic Projects’ on the EU Eastern Policy theme 
 
Year 
Commenced 
 
Title of Project  Lead Institution 
2005  Strengthening the Central European Contribution to 
the Eastern Dimension of the EU’s CFSP 
Prague  Security 
Studies’  Institute 
(Prague) 
2007   The  Evaluation  of  the  Visegrad  Countries’ 
Democratic Assistance Programmes 
Policy  Association  for 
an  Open  Society 
(Prague) 
2007  Strengthening  Visegrad  Cooperation  via  Foreign 
Policy  Research:  Channelling  Experiences  and 
Learning From each Other  
Hungarian  Institute  for 
International Affairs 
2008  Young Experts of Visegrad for the Future of Europe – 
Sharing the Experience of European Integration with 
Neighbouring Countries 
National  Fund  for 
Students  in  Hungary 
(Budapest) 
Source:  Annual Report of the International Visegrad Fund, various years 
4.  MULTILATERAL  VISEGRAD  COOPERATION  ON  EU  EASTERN  POLICY: 
OBSTACLES AND LIMITING FACTORS 
 
 
The final section deals with some problems surrounding the VG contribution to EU Eastern 
policy and broader Europeanisation processes in WNIS.  As far as the chance of the VG 
achieving any major strategic overhaul of Eastern policy is concerned, this is something that   15 
was probably quite unrealistic right from the start. The main thrust of ENP was established 
before the 2004 enlargement and was, for many, in any case path-dependent in that it utilised 
the basic enlargement methodology. This path-dependency reflects the limited ‘toolbox’ of 
the EU and the common ways (i.e. economic integration, adoption of elements of the ‘acquis’, 
political conditionality etc.) in which it tends to engage with membership candidates and 
aspirant candidates. Furthermore, any ideas of a ‘grand initiative, which would “interconnect 
ENP policy in Eastern Europe with its common spaces agenda with Russia” (Duleba, 2008, 
67) obviously runs up against a key problem. EU-Russia relations generally are bedevilled by 
divergent member states’ attitudes towards and relationships with Russia. Moreover, as Smith 
put it “several members states (particularly the large states, Germany, France and the UK) 
consider Russia to be too important a global player to let the EU lead in relations with it” 
(Smith, 2005, 286). Even the achievement of a membership perspective for say, Ukraine, 
faces too many formidable obstacles at the current time, including the many issues hampering 
further enlargement initiatives in general and again the Russia factor.
13  
Thus only piecemeal moves forward in relations with the WNIS were feasible to achieve, 
such as introduction of sectoral programmes, opening up more EU programmes, increase of 
funding to the Eastern flank of ENP, moves to Associate Membership,  the EP etc.. However, 
as is clear from section 3, the VG has only really played a secondary role in the incremental 
gains achieved so far. Therefore a very important overall observation on the VG multilateral 
approach is that the V4 have clearly not managed to exercise collective strategic leadership of 
EU policy towards Eastern neighbours. The main proposals for reforming the ENP have come 
from other major players in the EU. Most notably Germany, which seems to have retained its 
role as “the traditional driving force for a European Eastern policy” (Kempe, 2007, 34), with 
its ENP-plus being followed by reactions from individual CEE, including VG, states (Poland, 
essentially the lead VG country on Eastern policy, and also Lithuania) and most recently other 
alliances formed on this issue most notably Poland and Sweden for the EP proposal. The main 
contribution of the VG multilateral approach therefore has been as an alliance to support and 
push Eastern policy initiatives that get VG approval but which so far have not been products 
of a VG multilateral approach. The absence of a collective V4 lead even within the main 
parameters of ENP reform reflects a number of factors which have so far diluted a collective 
VG response to the challenges of EU relations with Eastern Europe. Some of these problems 
reflect the weaknesses of the concept of a VG multilateral approach. They not only affect the 
process of influencing EU policy but have also been holding back the both V4 effort in 
                                                 
13 Even the V4 do not explicitly state their joint support for Ukraine membership of the EU. Their 
many joint statements  approve the principle of  not refusing membership to any European country that 
can meet EU standards but it is not possible to find a clear endorsement of Ukrainian EU candidacy.     16 
helping to implement the current EU approach and the process of supplementing it with their 
own programmes to further the Europeanisation of the WNIS.  
First, the relatively greater commitment of Poland in terms of the intensity of its concern with 
WNIS  (and  predominantly  Ukraine)  brings  into  play  what  has  long  been  perceived  as  a 
traditional ‘structural’ weakness of the VG - Poland’s size and the longstanding ‘regional 
power/leader’ self-perception The other Visegrad countries’ tend to harbour suspicion about a 
Polish tendency to see the VG not as a collective exercise but rather as a vehicle for Poland to 
use as and when in order to ‘amplify’ its own preferences and also as a ‘forum of last resort’. 
This connects to a proclivity for the VG members to ‘break ranks’ and act independently 
and/or work with other partners, as per Poland’s decision to collaborate with Sweden on the 
EP.  The  key  principles  –  e.g.  a  separate  approach  for  Eastern  neighbours  to  include  a 
regional/multilateral  framework  -  of  the  EP  were  discussed  many  times  by  the  V4  and 
represented  a  shared  VG  vision.  But  the  EP  itself  was  not  elaborated  within  the  VG 
mechanism  and  was  not  subject  to  consultation  with  the  Czech  2007/8  VG  Presidency. 
Though the VG partners subsequently endorsed and expressed support for the EP concept, 
this episode vividly demonstrated that the VG is not the automatic platform for launching 
major inputs to EU Eastern policy. Yet this should not be seen as a purely Polish tendency 
and it has been interesting to note that the EU Eastern policy issue has generated a kind of 
‘leadership competition’ within the VG, particularly between the Czechs and the Poles. The 
Czech government, maybe mindful of its then current ‘leadership’ status as VG Chair and 
forthcoming EU Presidency, prepared its own proposal for an upgrading and strengthening of 
EU  Eastern  Policy  (‘ENP  and  Eastern  Neighbourhood    -  Time  to  Act’)  in  April  2008. 
Furthermore,  it  also  presented  a  proposal  on  EU-Belarus  relations to  a  GAERC  working 
group, much to the chagrin of the other V4 who had understood that this was supposed to be a 
joint V4 paper.
14  
Second, due to some of the factors mentioned above, the mechanics of drafting common VG 
strategy papers for the ENP tend to be rather protracted and beset by bureaucratic procedures 
and diplomatic issues which make for haggling over fine detail and insistence that national 
stances are reflected. The April 2007 Visegrad Group Contribution to the Discussion on the 
Strengthening of the European Neighbourhood Policy  was arguably something of a rather 
bland, ‘compromise’ text containing with mainly already well rehearsed positions rather than 
any far-reaching novel solutions. Frustration with a slow process and competitive tendencies 
can mean partners may prefer to keep ‘big ideas’ back from collective diplomacy and present 
them as triumphs of national diplomacy. These difficulties also seem to indicate that the VG 
is not capable of fast collective detailed policy responses when windows of opportunity such 
                                                 
14  I  would  like  to  thank  Michal  Koran  and  Joanna  Kaminska  for  informing  me  about  these 
developments.    17 
as the Sarkhozy Mediterranean Union initiative (which obviously helped pave the way for the 
EP) present themselves. 
Third, specific VG multilateral assistance to WNIS reform programmes is obviously limited 
by the amount of resources the VG states can provide. The relatively small scale of VG funds 
may cause the recipient states to see the VG itself as a rather minor player or even irrelevant 
(for them). While this doesn’t rule out useful and welcome contributions (e.g. the Incoming 
Visegrad  Scholarships),  larger  scale  impact  will  necessitate  collective  access  of  EU 
programmes.  Uneven  allocations  of  the  limited  funding  has  also  caused  some  mild 
resentment.  Moldova,  for  example,  argues  that,  like  Ukraine,  it  should  have  a  dedicated 
stream  of  funding  for  IVF  Scholarships.  Fourth,  the  unwillingness  of  the  VG  to  enlarge 
undermines its image as a serious player in the Europeanisation process of key neighbours. So 
far certain of the VG states (most notably the Czech Republic and Slovakia in response to 
past interest from Austria, Slovenia and Ukraine.) have blocked enlargement on grounds that 
the  cooperation  would  be  diluted  and  the  VG  would  lose  its  distinct  identity.  However, 
admission of strategic countries, such as Ukraine, and locking them into the VG’s manifold 
cooperation  schemes  would  presumably  expand  and  intensify  their  Europeanisation 
endeavour by opening up the full array of intra-VG cross-border activities. Fifth, the VG 
multilateral approach is clearly held back by the lack of a Visegrad Secretariat empowered to 
develop and coordinate new instruments and measures, and to act as a policy entrepreneur. 
The  experience  of  the  CEI  is  illustrative,  where  the  Trieste  based  Secretariat  has  been 
important in focusing and developing the CEI agenda. However, for various reasons there are 
no prospects for a VG Secretariat to appear in the foreseeable future.  
Sixth,  the  capacity  and  motivation  of  VG  state  institutions  to  engage  in  knowledge 
transfer/experience-sharing activities with their Eastern counterparts may be an issue. Despite 
the V4  announcement in 2005  (see  Dangerfield,  2008a)  that  a  significant  engagement  in 
‘twinning’ by VG actors would be a priority aspect of the VG contribution to Eastern states’ 
Europeanisation, participation of VG states has been low so far. In the case of twinning 
projects  for  Ukraine, for example,  there  are  no  projects  led  by  a  V4  state  and  as  far  as 
involvement as partners is concerned, Hungary and Poland are participating in two projects 
each, Slovakia is not involved in any and Czech participation is also minimal.
15 
Seventh, the current Polish VG Presidency Programme, in recognition of an  unexploited 
realm of multilateral cooperation, is to “seek closer coordination of assistance undertakings, 
particular of a technical character, addressed to those states in the V4 neighbourhood, i.e. 
Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and the Caucasus…we will host in Warsaw in October 2008 a 
conference  on  assistance  activities  of  V4  countries.  This  will  enable  us  to  exchange 
                                                 
15 This data was obtained from the National Twinning Contact Points of the V4 countries.   18 
experience in this field and to broadly discuss different  means and forms of providing and 
implementing  joint  projects  addressed  to  V4  neighbouring  states,  while  taking  into 
consideration  a  possible form  of  more  institutionalised  cooperation” (Polish VG  Program 
2008/9,2 ). Lack of coordination of bilateral assistance programmes stems from differences in 
the scale and type of aid given, the length of time assistance programmes have been in place, 
alternative national priorities (Ukraine is not a priority country for the Czech Republic for 
example; Hungary attaches greatest importance to the West Balkans) and preferences for 
working  bilaterally  or  through  other  subregional  programmes  other  than  the  VG  (see 
Hamberger, 2006, pp.96-7). On this theme, Kratochvil and Tumets make an important related 
point that within the Czech Republic at least “institutional coordination of the (European 
Neighbourhood – author’s insertion) policy is also extremely difficult…Although a number of 
central institutions deal with ENP partner countries, they seldom see their activities as part of 
the ENP. Consequently, the only institution really dealing with the ENP is the Ministry of 
Foreign  Affairs;  however  even  there  the  communication  has  to  overcoming  substantial 
problems.  In  particular  the  existence  of  several  departments  dealing  with  the  ENP” 
(Kratochvil & Tumets, 2007, 11). However, initiatives taken in 2005 by the Czech Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and more recently by the Slovak MFA on  bilateral assistance 
offers to Ukraine (see below) may indicate that the question of institutional capacity may 
assessed  too  pessimistically  and  needs  to  be  carefully  nuanced.  VG  coordination  of  the 
activities and programmes of NGOs has also been lacking. In sum, coordination of bilateral 
assistance has been an area of significant but unfulfilled potential for now, but one which the 
V4 now seem to be getting round to addressing.  
The capacity of the WNIS states – political and institutional - to receive the experience-
sharing assistance from any source also seems to have been a problem. In June 2005 a Czech 
MFA ‘non-paper’ elaborated suggestions for Czech-Ukraine bilateral cooperation in order to 
assist Ukraine with implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. It specified the exact 
fields of assistance on offer and the Czech Ministries available and willing to engage in the 
assistance.  This  text  was  communicated  to  the  Ukrainian  government  and  invited  the 
responses  and  further  suggestions  from  the  appropriate  Ukrainian  partners  who  were 
essentially those ministries with the appropriate competencies. No serious take-up of this 
offer was received. This seems to indicate therefore that up until now at least experience-
sharing efforts have come up against weaknesses in the capacity of the Ukrainian state bodies 
to  engage  with  a  comprehensive  and  structured  reform  assistance  programme,  especially 
when no funding incentives have been on offer.
16 On the positive side, it also means that role 
                                                 
16 This episode echoes findings of recent studies by certain specialists on Ukraine. See, especially, 
Wolczuk  (2008)    and    Solonenko  who  argues  that  “pro-EU  interests  are  not  well-entrenched  in 
Ukraine,  at  least  not  enough  to  create  successful  pressure  for  reforms…the  EU  has  to  pay  more   19 
of the VG states could well take off significantly in the future should Ukraine and the other 
WNIS succeed in building the necessary reform momentum and capacity. Since the Slovak 
MFA currently operates a programme called “Slovak Republic – Ukraine cooperation on EU 
– Ukraine Action Plan”, some evidence on the current state of play should be available soon. 
The 2008 programme entailed some nineteen (mostly co-financed) activities (seminars, study 
tours, training courses) focused on helping Ukraine approach EU standards across a number 
of themes.  
Finally, the question of the extent to which the V4 (and CEECs in general) are unified on the 
Eastern  question  and  whether  and  how  significantly  this  impedes  VG  collaboration.  In 
particular, what is the impact of alternative attitudes towards Russia – especially resonant 
given the different assessments of the Russia-Georgia conflict which were evident between 
and within the V4 political elites? Kratochvil has written that the assumption that CEE states 
are “all supportive of further enlargement, they are all very critical of Russia, and they are all 
dissatisfied with the ENP in its present form” does generally apply. However, a more detailed 
assessment reveals “striking differences – both in their approach to the East and in their 
assessment  of  the  ENP”  (Kratochvil,  2007,  191).  Whilst  Ktratochvil’s  analysis  sees  less 
disunity within the V4 compared with across the whole CEE group (see Table 3), it does seem 
to be sufficient enough to doubt that a VG Eastern policy of common direction and intensity  
can prevail due to: differing levels of commitment to the Eastern policy issue;  the ‘latecomer’ 
status of the ‘three’ (and underdevelopment of foreign policy measures therefore) compared 
to Poland’s longstanding attention to the Eastern dimension; variations in country preferences 
and expertise (though this could also be a strength as it provides a basis for a division of 
labour in assistance/experience-sharing  programmes etc.); and the Russia factor given that 
“unlike Poland, the three smaller Visegrad countries wish to maintain good relations with 
Russia, and sometimes they are even willing to sacrifice their ties with other East European 
countries” (Kratochvil, 2007, 193).  
Different attitudes to Russia do not so far seem to be a serious problem so far for the VG 
multilateral approach as it stands. For one, the ‘low-key’ nature and scale of V4 involvement 
in  the  Eastern  neighbourhood  is  such  that  it  tends  not  to  cut  across  the  V4  individual 
considerations vis-à-vis Russia (when it comes to IVF activities, for example, Russia takes 
part).  Also,  as  with  many  sensitive  policy  areas  and  in  accordance  with  standard 
understanding  of  the  boundaries  of VG  cooperation,  there is  no  ambition to  have  policy 
                                                                                                                                            
attention to capacity-building of the civil service in order to support its so-far positive response to the 
ENP tools” Solonenko (2008, 34).   20 
coordination on such a ‘high politics’ topic as relations with Russia.
17 Russia policy and 
closely-connected aspects of ‘hard’ security policy (Slovakia and Hungary, for example, were 
not enthusiastic about the proposed Missile Defence System deployment in their V4 allies) 
remain the province of national policy and not in the realm of V4 coordination. In any case, 
the threshold for VG states cooperation on issues pertinent to relations with Russia seems in 
fact to be to be quite high if recent evidence is anything to go by. To illustrate this with an 
example, the current programme of the VG, under the Polish 2008/9 presidency, aims to 
transfer  NATO  and  EU  accession-related  experience  to  Georgia  and  Ukraine  and,  to 
coordinate “the input of V4 states to the allied debate on granting the MAP to Georgia and 
Ukraine” (Polish VG Program 2008/9, 10).  
 
Table 3 Differing Preferences and Strategies of VG states 
 
                              Importance                   Main                          Start of                       Relation to 
                             of the Eastern            geographical                involvement                   Russia 
                               dimension                   focus 
         
 
Poland                   Top priority               Ukraine,                     Before 2004                    Tense 
                                                                 Belarus                       enlargement 
 
 
Visegrad               One of several            Ukraine,                      Mainly after                    Cautious 
(- Poland)               priorities                   Moldova                           2004  
 
 
Source: Reproduced from Kratochvil, (2007), p.195  
 
 
  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Since 2004 the EU Eastern policy issue has been increasingly prominent in both VG rhetoric 
and concrete cooperation activities. Joint VG attempts to achieve significant inputs to EU 
policy became more observable after the end of 2006 and ENP has tended to develop in a way 
that reflects at least some of the V4 preferences. However, the VG collectively has not played 
a lead role in the reform of ENP to date. Key moves forward have come from the large EU 
states (Germany and ENP-plus, France and the Mediterranean Union) and from other intra-
EU alliances (Poland/Sweden). So far the VG role – albeit an important one - has been to 
                                                 
17 Another example of a sensitive policy area on which a unified V4 approach was not possible was the 
timing of imposition of visa requirements on Ukrainian nationals prior to EU accession, which the V4 
were unable to coordinate.  
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endorse and advocate these other initiatives and to facilitate policy alliances with other EU 
states seeking to get advantages for the Eastern dimension of ENP. Various factors have 
limited the effectiveness of VG cooperation towards the Eastern neighbours in the first few 
years of the post-enlargement period. Some of these reflect some fundamental weaknesses of 
the multilateral concept. Others suggest that the VG multilateral contribution to EU Eastern 
policy  is  probably  below potential at the current  time,  particularly  when it comes  to  the 
operational dimension of reform assistance and promotion. Further reform progress inside the 
WNIS and stronger EU commitment to integration with them could facilitate an upgraded VG 
contribution. Finally, one might expect that divergent approaches to relations with Russia 
would have considerable scope to undermine the VG cooperation on EU Eastern policy. This 
does not seem to be the case so far and, rather than the fallout from the Russia-Georgia 
incident having caused any disruption to the VG’s role in EU Eastern policy, it has actually 
brought about increased opportunities. It resulted in not only an acceleration of the EP project 
but also stimulated a more accommodating stance on Belarus. These outcomes are likely to 
result in further opportunities both for VG bilateral and multilateral initiatives towards WNIS. 
The key question is whether VG cooperation will be sufficiently robust, coordinated and 
resourced to take advantage of them.  
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